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Legislation to reform Japan Post is again gathering steam in 
Tokyo. The real question is whether the latest act in this long-
running drama will represent true reform or in fact will camou-
flage an entrenchment of Japan Post’s formidable monopoly 
powers. Antireform proposals being lined up for consideration 
in  the  Diet  would  indefinitely  extend  effective  government 
control of Japan Post’s financial arms (thereby reversing the 
Koizumi era reforms). On the other hand, reform forces in the 
Japanese government want new legislation to guarantee a level 
playing field in banking and insurance between Japan Post and 
private firms, whether domestic or foreign. How the contest 
between  antireform  and  proreform  forces  plays  out  matters 
both to Japan and the world: 
n  Japan Post ranks among the largest state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) on the planet, combining the world’s largest bank 
and  insurance  operations  with  postal  delivery  under  an 
umbrella holding company. If Japan Post cannot be made to 
operate on a level playing field with private firms, who can?
n  Japan Post channels 80 percent of the financial savings of 
its  Japanese  account  holders  into  Japanese  government 
bonds, thereby ensuring gross distortion of Japan’s internal 
capital market. 
n  Japan Post draws on a number of government privileges—
most notably light regulation and exemptions from statu-
tory prohibitions on strategic combinations—to market 
its own insurance products in competition with private 
insurance firms, both domestic and foreign-owned. At the 
same time, it has been unwilling to offer private insurance 
products other than through a small number of outlets in 
its vast postal distribution network.
The favorable treatment received by Japan Post from the 
government  effectively  tilts  the  playing  field  against  foreign 
and  domestic  private  banks  and  insurance  firms.  This  is 
protectionism,  pure  and  simple,  and  puts  the  government 
of Japan in clear violation of its commitments to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The Japanese government did not 
take an exemption for Japan Post when it signed the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in 1994; hence the 
operations of Japan Post and its financial units are inconsistent 
with Japan’s international commitments under GATS Article 
XVII,  National  Treatment.  Japan  Post’s  operations  are  not 
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only inconsistent with agreed international rules but also are 
bad for Japanese taxpayers and consumers. Taxpayers, whether 
they know it or not, are the ultimate guarantors of Japan Post’s 
huge financial liabilities arising from its banking and insurance 
operations. Consumers miss the array of banking and insurance 
products that would be available if Japan Post did not occupy a 
privileged perch that crowds out private firms. 
Koizumi RefoRms
In  our  Policy  Brief  in  October  2010,  Turning  Back  the 
Clock: Japan’s Misguided Postal Law Is Back on the Table,1 we 
recounted the recent history of reform efforts. The starting 
point  was  Prime  Minister  Junichiro  Koizumi’s  landmark 
reform  bill,  passed  in  2005,  which  envisaged  substantial 
privatization by 2017. By October 2007, the state-run postal 
service was split into four companies under the umbrella of 
Japan Post Holdings Co. Ltd. The new companies were Japan 
Post Service, Japan Post Network, Japan Post Bank, and Japan 
Post Insurance. Koizumi’s Postal Privatization Law scheduled 
100 percent privatization of Japan Post Holdings’ two finan-
cial subsidiaries by 2017. 
TuRning BacK The clocK
After the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power in 
2009, DPJ kingmaker and General Secretary Ichiro Ozawa, 
together with Shizuka Kamei, then minister of state for finan-
cial services and postal reform, sought to reverse the Koizumi 
reforms. On May 31, 2010, with almost no debate, the Lower 
House approved legislation that would restructure Japan Post 
Holdings and allow the government to hold one-third of its 
shares  indefinitely,  essentially  a  controlling  position.  Japan 
Post Holdings, Japan Post Service, and Japan Post Network 
would be merged into a single holding company, while Japan 
1. Gary Hufbauer and Julia Muir, Turning Back the Clock: Japan’s Misguided 
Postal Law Is Back on the Table, Policy Briefs in International Economics 
10-17, October 2010, Peterson Institute for International Economics, www.
piie.com.
Post Bank and Japan Post Insurance would be subsidiaries of 
the newly merged parent company, with at least one-third 
of  their  shares  held  indefinitely  by  the  holding  company. 
As a practical matter, the holder of one-third of the shares 
in  the  postal  businesses  will  be  able  to  exert  control  over 
them, particularly given the fact that the government is the 
shareholder and that the other shares are likely to be widely 
dispersed and/or held by institutions that can be expected to 
support the government’s positions. Accordingly, if enacted 
into law, the Lower House bill would ensure that the govern-
ment retained control not only over Japan Post Holdings but 
also over the two financial subsidiaries. At the same time, the 
procedural  safeguards  on  insurance  offerings  of  Japan  Post 
Insurance would be largely removed.
The antireform bill ran aground during the second half 
of  2010.  DPJ  Prime  Minister  Yukio  Hatoyama  suddenly 
resigned on June 2, 2010 and was succeeded by Naoto Kan. 
Unlike Hatoyama, Kan was not an enthusiast for rolling back 
the  Koizumi  reforms,  and  he  postponed  consideration  of 
the new legislation by the Upper House until the 2011 Diet 
session. Over the next year, intensive consultations were held 
between the DPJ, its coalition partner the People’s New Party 
(PNP), the opposition Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and 
the  opposition  New  Komeito  Party  (NKP).  The  one  solid 
outcome of these consultations was the death of the antire-
form bill passed by the Lower House in May 2010. It simply 
could not attract enough votes to pass the Upper House or 
win a “supermajority” (more than two-thirds of votes) in the 
Lower House.
PosTal RefoRm meeTs ReconsTRucTion 
funding
On March 11, 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake (as it 
is called in Japan) struck the Tohoku area (Richter scale 9.0), 
unleashing a tsunami with a maximum height of 40.5 meters 
(unprecedented for a thousand years), leading to a calamitous 
meltdown of the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. The loss 
of life from flooding (not radiation) was enormous—some 
20,000  people—and  125,000  buildings  were  damaged  or 
destroyed along with roadways, rail lines, and other infrastruc-
ture. The World Bank estimated direct and indirect economic 
losses at $235 billion, the most expensive natural disaster on 
record. Numerous private relief efforts were quickly launched 
and the government announced its own relief plan costing 
¥23 trillion or more (more than $300 billion) during the ten-
year reconstruction period. 
The  earthquake  and  its  aftermath  triggered  devastating 
criticism  of Tokyo  Electric  Power  and  the  Japanese  officials 
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responsible for nuclear oversight and disaster relief. As a direct 
consequence, on August 30, 2011, Prime Minister Kan resigned 
and was succeeded by his finance minister, Yoshihiko Noda. 
Augmenting relief plans already in motion, Prime Minister 
Noda and his cabinet announced their basic policy in the Third 
Supplementary Budget and Reconstruction Funding, released 
on October 7, 2011. The Third Supplementary Budget was 
submitted by the Noda cabinet to the Diet on October 21, 
2011, and included ¥12 trillion ($156 billion) funding for 
reconstruction, almost all of which will be financed by the 
government issue of “reconstruction” bonds. 
In  its  October  7,  2011  cabinet  decision,  the  govern-
ment planned to raise ¥7 trillion (almost $90 billion) from 
“nontax revenue” over the next ten years to help finance the 
reconstruction  bonds.  Potential  sources  of  nontax  revenue 
included the sale of government shares in Japan Tobacco and 
Japan Post. Very quickly antireform forces within the govern-
ment—notably the People’s New Party, a member of the DPJ 
ruling coalition—saw future sales of Japan Post shares as a 
vehicle for pushing their latest version of “postal reform” legis-
lation. Japan Post would be “privatized” through the sale of 
up to two-thirds of government shares, but the government 
would  retain  at  least  one-third,  effectively  maintaining  its 
controlling position. Nobody knows how much revenue the 
government can actually generate by selling shares in the Japan 
Post group, and the government’s retention of a controlling 
interest would clearly cut into the revenue objective. But aside 
from the revenue angle there is the all-important question of 
Japan Post’s business model in the decade ahead.
 A new idea has emerged over the last few weeks from 
discussions  between  the  ruling  and  opposition  parties: 
“amendments” can be made, not to the moribund May 2010 
legislation but rather to the existing Postal Privatization Law 
dating from the Koizumi era. The New Komeito Party floated 
a proposal to amend the existing law in a way that would 
merge two of the postal companies—Japan Post Service and 
Japan  Post  Network—into  one  firm  and  allow  Japan  Post 
Holdings to retain more than one-third of its shares in Japan 
Post Insurance and Japan Post Bank indefinitely. Just like the 
May 2010 bill, these “amendments” would effectively ensure 
that no member of the Japan Post group would leave the ranks 
of state-controlled enterprise. 
On December 21, 2011, PNP President Shizuka Kamei 
(previously a minister of state for financial services and postal 
reform) and DPJ Secretary-General Azuma Koshiishi agreed 
to use NPK’s proposal as a basis to achieve early passage of 
the postal bill during the next Diet session. Their meeting 
was to be followed by intense DPJ consultations with oppo-
sition parties. However, the DPJ ended the year 2011 with 
acrimonious in-party debate over a consumption tax hike and 
nine DPJ members left the party in opposition to the hike. 
Although the DPJ finalized its tax proposal on December 30, 
2011, the outcome triggered harsh criticism from the oppo-
sition parties, including the LDP and NPK, which in turn 
rejected  negotiations  with  the  DPJ  over  the  postal  reform 
plan.  Consequently  Prime  Minister  Noda  announced  his 
decision to reshuffle his cabinet, which will likely take place 
January 13. Nevertheless, before or even during the upcoming 
Diet session, which will probably open around January 24, 
2012, a new postal bill could be taking shape, in the form 
of amendments to the existing Postal Privatization Law—all 
put forward under the larger banner of reconstruction finance 
and the government’s efforts to minimize consumption tax 
hikes. In public pronouncements, the contradiction between 
the revenue goal and government retention of a controlling 
interest (through one-third share ownership) will be conve-
niently ignored.
PosTal RefoRm meeTs The TRans-Pacific 
PaRTneRshiP
Japan’s commitment to national treatment for foreign insur-
ance firms and banks, extended to all WTO members in the 
1994 General Agreement on Trade in Services, has long been 
contradicted  by  the  practices  of  Japan  Post.2  After  Prime 
Minister Noda’s declaration at the November 2011 Honolulu 
Summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
forum , throwing Japan’s hat into the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) ring, the contradiction between commitment and prac-
tice has now reached the front burner. Japan Post’s operations 
not only violate the GATS but also are at odds with the SOE 
drafts  now  being  circulated  among  the  nine  current  TPP 
parties and four aspirants.3 While the draft SOE texts have 
not been released, certain principles seem highly likely:
n  SOEs will be defined as state-controlled firms that engage 
in  commercial  transactions  in  competition  with  private 
firms.
n  SOEs should buy and sell for commercial consideration.
n  SOEs should be transparent with respect to their share-
holders and organization.
2. The contradictions are explained in Hufbauer and Muir, Turning Back the 
Clock.
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n  The national regulator should be nondiscriminatory as 
between SOEs and private firms.
n  The national treatment principle must be respected.
Details  of  the  new  postal  bill  remain  to  be  decided. 
However,  the  New  Komeito-Kamei-Koshiishi  outline  is 
squarely  “antireform”  and  if  passed  into  law  would  create 
a major hurdle to Japan’s membership in the TPP. But it is 
possible that a constructive approach will be hammered out in 
consultations between the DPJ and opposition parties. Here 
we offer recommendations as to the tenor of a true Japan Post 
reform bill, one that would represent a step forward rather 
than a step back.
Ironically,  privatization  need  not  be  the  central  goal, 
even if privatization was sufficiently bold that no member of 
the Japan Post group could be considered a state-controlled 
enterprise (SCE). The reason is that privatization per se will 
not ensure that the giant members of the Japan Post group 
dealt fairly with private firms. Nor will it ensure even-handed 
oversight by regulatory bodies.
Privatization should be part of postal reform legislation, 
both to raise reconstruction funds and to reinforce the transi-
tion to nonprivileged status for members of the Japan Post 
group. However, other elements are equally important:
n  Japan Post Bank and Japan Post Insurance should not 
be  permitted  to  extend  their  product  offerings  unless 
it is crystal clear that they no longer enjoy government       
privileges, including less stringent regulation than their 
private-sector competitors.
n  To the extent that Japan Post Network distributes Japan 
Post Bank and Japan Post Insurance products through its 
vast network of postal offices, it should equally distribute 
the products of sound private bank and insurance firms.
n  Japan  Post  Bank  and  Japan  Post  Insurance  should  be 
subject to the same licensing and holding company regula-
tions as private firms under Japanese Insurance Business 
and Banking Laws. The Japan Financial Services Agency 
should treat Japan Post group members the same as private 
firms.
n  Japan Post should pay all taxes under the same rules that 
apply to private firms, and they should publish statements 
audited under international accounting standards. Bank 
accounts and insurance policies that enjoy a government 
guarantee  should  be  separately  reported,  and  earnings 
from these products should not be used to cross-subsidize 
other accounts and policies. 
It is critical for the postal reform bill to anticipate Japan’s 
membership in the TPP. This can be done by embracing the 
reforms just noted and reflecting the principles of draft SOE 
texts. As it evaluates Japan’s membership in the TPP, the US 
Congress will focus on three issues: autos, beef, and Japan 
Post. Rather than enacting postal reform legislation with a 
“step back” flavor—thereby creating a major hurdle to TPP 
accession—the Diet should seize this opportunity to enact 
postal reform that will be a true “step forward.”
Rather than enacting postal reform 
legislation with a “step back” 
flavor…the Diet should seize this 
opportunity to enact postal reform 
that will be a true “step forward.”